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Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Education 
by 
Howard Kiefer 
The university is not the world. In the world, if you explore problems which 
turn out to be of considerable interest to others, but never publicly recommend 
practical solutions to those problems, you may forfeit a chance to become famous, 
perhaps ·to become a successful politician, or even to become (what may not be 
quite the same thing) a recognized benefactor of mankind; but in the university, 
it is not impossible that you may become a full professor. This paper, as its title 
suggests, is intended as commentary on a few of education's problems and dilem· 
mas; it is not an attempt to present an exhaustive analysis of them, nor a vehicle 
urging adoption of procedures aimed at solving them. Should this lead you to think 
that it must then surely be only of limited practical value, I would say that those of 
us who enjoy doing this sort of thing believe it would be friendlier of you to thinlc 
of it as a kind of pure research. . 
After first touching briefly on the minor matter of the apparent unpopular­
jty of the philosophy of education in certain quarters, I shall consider two ques­
tions, one concerning educational philosophy at the public school level historically, 
and the other at the higher education level currently, and offer comments on both: 
(1) How could so many of the philosophical ideas and educational proposals of 
John Dewey come to produce an influence on public education which Dewey him­
self acknowledged to be; at least in part, anti-intellectual in character and antitheti­
cal to the best interest of pupils? (-2) What are some of the important philosophical 
issues arising from current trends toward egalitarianism and vocationalism in higher 
education, as they come into conflict with traditional interpretations of the curric­
ular role of the liberal arts and the principle of exclusivity'? 
* * * * . * * * * * * 
One of the striking things about the philosophy of education is the relatively 
low status assigne<hto it in the hierarchy of scholarly subjects. This surely is a 
matter of no great importance, but its brief consideration provides me with the 
opportunity to consider a number of negative reactions to the field, for whatever 
use they may have·in sharpening our critical judgments of it. 
It is no secret that of all the birds in philosophy's curricular nest, educational 
philosophy is considered by a majority of philosophy professors to be the ugliest 
duckling. Just why this is so, · no one seems to be entirely sure. If pressed, some are 
willing to state privately that the philosophy of education, at least as a subject to be 
taught, has more than its fair share of those unattractive chara�teristics which, 
rightly or wrongly, occasionally are attributed to other fields of philosophical 
inquiry: i.e., too many of its issues are irreducibly impre.cise, leading unavoidably 
to excessive speculation by everyone; the field has the reputation of attracting 
those who tend to be enthusiasts or apologists; too many theoretical proposals in 
the area seem to have no apparent practical application; much of what.has been 
done in the field has been too utopian, too pedantic, too dated, or perhaps just too 
endlessly boring; etc. All pr<>fessors of philosophy a�e, of course, that educational 
philosophy has commanded the serious attention of at least a few of the· greatest 
81 
2
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 11 [1980], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol11/iss1/1
Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Education 
and most influential philosophers in the West, from Plato to Russell -- as well as a 
number of admittedly successful and distinguished philosophers now alive and 
writing. Nor does anyone hesitate to acknowledge that its investigation surely does 
not exclude (and indeed may require) consideration of certain. familiar questions 
and problems which are of perennial interest to philosophers, namely, questions 
about the nature of man and society, and problems of knowledge and value. While 
quite willing to recognize all this, some professors of philosophy still maintain that 
too much of what has been written under the educational philosophy label -- the 
important work of some of the more important philosophers perhaps excepted -­
lacks proper intellectual rigor, often seems to be poorly informed philosophically, 
or seems over-concerned with the promotion of (1) a transparently naive view of 
human nature, or (2) with the urging of the use of organized education as a sure­
cure for social malaise, or both. 
To whatever extent we may agree or disagree with the above, I should hope 
that all of us would be sympathetic to the call for intellectual integrity implicit 
therein. Surely it is not unreasonable to ask (however much it might be unrealistic 
to expect) that writing in the field of educational philosophy -- or any other field, 
for that matter -- give evidence of being fairly well thought through and perhaps 
even agonized over; if it is to deserve critical respect. This is not to say that any 
series of proposals in the area of philosophy of education must have been so thor­
oughly analyzed as to have achieved logically demonstrable conclusions or have 
uncovered final answers for all of us to marvel at; on the contrary, it is only to say 
that there must be reason to believe that at least some tough-minded thinking has 
gone on here and there, and that the author has been reasonably successful in avoid­
ing the edge of whatever intellectual axe he may be discovered grinding. 
However that may be, I suspect that the unpopularity of educational philo­
sophy with many philosophy professors is not really so much a matter of philo­
sophical or intellectual standards of judgment; it may be more than a little psycho­
logical. Professors of philosophy, like most of the rest of mankind, prefer success 
to failure, and in teaching it is commoiily believed that successful instruction has 
something to do with the attitudes and interests of the students. The students who 
are most likely to have the philosophical interests and at least the beginning of the 
background of knowledge which should permit professors of philosophy to exercise 
their hard-won expertise most effectively in the classroom, are those students maj­
oring in philosophy .at the undergraduate or graduate levels of instrnction. But 
philosophy majors seldom seem to select courses in educational philosophy, possi­
bly because such courses promise to be of little help in preparing for advanced work 
in logic, epistemology, metaphysics, value theory, or the inevitable seminars in 
Wittgenstein and Kant. On the other hand, a typical student group one might find 
enrolled in an educational philosophy class often includes a sizeable sprinkling of 
Education majors, many of whom may have thus far succeeded in keeping free from 
philosophy as an academic subject, and some of whom may have accumulated 
serious doubts as to the importance of the study of theoretical matters. Faced too 
often with this, one may understand why some philosophy professors seem willing 
to abandon the time-honored principle of the balkanization of the disciplines, and 
may recommend that educational philosophy be offered, perhaps even exclusively 
if necessary, by the Education department. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
In the world outside the university, the ultimate worth of the philos.ophy of 
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education is measured according to the nature and degree of influence it brings to 
bear on educational practice. Opinion may be divided as to current levels of such 
influence, but intellectual historians agree that during the second quarter of the 
twentieth century the philosophical and educational ideas of John Dewey came to 
have an immense influence on American public education, possibly one of the 
most remarkable influences ever exercised by philosophical thought on public 
practice. There are many interesting facets to the story of this influence, and they 
justify a closer look. 
Both the range and depth of Dewey's philosophical writings are impressive. 
His genius extends beyond educational philosophy to other important fields of 
inquiry, including logic, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of art, social 
theory, and more, but even his staunchest supporters and admirers would not insist 
that it extends with equal brilliance to his writing style. It cannot be denied that 
Dewey writes with dedication and thoroughness, and does not hesitate to attempt 
explanation of the most complex of issues, but he is not a popularizer, and it would 
be thought exceptional if someone were to claim to have been kept from a good 
night's sleep by the excitement of Dewey's prose. In his youth he was influenced 
by Hegel, with whom he came to disagree philosophically, but he never seemed to 
be able to free himself completely from what has been described as a somewhat 
Hegelian manner of expression, in which it is not impossible for a sentence to go on 
for most of a page before losing itself at last among the qualification and distinc· 
tions of a concluding subordinate clause. 
How, then, we may reasonably ask, did his ideas come to hav:e so profound 
an effect on public school teachers and other educational personnel, who would 
seem to have no special fondness for the abstruse? Diane Ravitch of Teachers Col· 
lege, Columbia University, recently put it as follows: 
, 
During the 1930's and 1940's, an adulterated version of John Dewey's 
educational philosophy became the reigning dogma of the educa­
tional profession. Why this was so is less easy to ascertain than the 
fact that it was so. Perhaps it was because Dewey was the only first· 
rate philosopher who took a deep interest in elementary and second­
ary education ; perhaps it was because Dewey's ideas were quickly 
and easily adapted to meet the problems of the public schools dur­
ing a period of unprecedented e�panslon; perhaps it was because his 
ideas were like the proverbial "witches mirror," reflecting whatever 
the viewer saw in them .... 1 
Ravitch thus joins many writers now dealing with this period who have stated or at 
least implied that it really was not Dewey the ordinary educators were reading or 
listening to, but his popularizers and supporters from within the educational estab· 
lishment. Textbooks on educational philosophy published during this period also 
supported the new education, sometimes contrasting the modern-day, Deweyan 
experimentalism they advocated with what was called "Idealism" on the one hand, 
or "Essentialism" on the other. Idealism was described as the point of view of 
philosophers who declare for the absolute and unchanging nature of reality and 
truth, apparently beginning with Plato's epistemology and doctrine of forms and 
proceeding through a modified version of nineteenth century Hegelianism. Essen­
tialism, portrayed as equally unfortunate in its absolutistic tendencies, was seen as 
associated initially with Aristotle's analysis of man's nature, including the ethical 
and noetic virtues, and was described as the philosophy followed by those advocat-
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ing a generally inflexible curriculum of "essential" subjects designed to accommo­
date man's unchanging essence. Thus, the young P':lblic school teache� of the time, 
whose formal education had been completed in the Normal Schools and teacher's 
colleges of the nineteen-thirties a.nd nineteen-forties (which, to put it mildly, sel­
dom left them with any extended familiarity with philosophical matters) were 
given the clear choice of accepting the. modern , scientific, psychologically-oriented 
educational philosophy of progressivism, or being placed in the position of seem­
ing to advocate an absolutism reported to be out-of-date by approximately twenty. 
three centuries. Progressivism had its critics, of course, and other points of view 
their advocates, but for many . teachers, especially those ·seeking professional ad­
vancement through the winning of graduate degrees in universities and colleges 
where progressivism was championed, the choice was not very hard to make. 
Ravitch again: 
Misapplications of Dewey's ideas finally provoked him to criticize 
his misinterpreters. In a. book published in 1938, entitled Experience 
and Education, Dewey tried to set the record straight by rebuking 
those ·who thought that all experiences were equally educative, that 
following a student's impulse was a substitute for educational pur­
pose, that subject matter could be abandoned, that the past was 
irrelevant to the present and future, and th.at the teacher's role was ·t o avoid impinging on the spontaneous growth of the pupil.2 
But for a time, at least, the self-appointed spokesman for Dewey triumphed 
over the old scholar's last efforts. The movement, known variously as experiment­
alism (which Dewey preferred), progressive education (the popular label), progress­
ivism, child-c•entered education, and so on, kept the momentum goi.ng well into the 
nineteen-fifties, when the U.S. Office of Education actively promoted what was 
called "Life Adjustment Education," which advocated sweeping changes in both 
elementary and secondary school curricula. Its declared purpose was to "de-em­
phasize" the formal acquisition of knQwledge and cognitive skills in order to stress 
practical "how to" courses, the development of social attitudes, and the training of 
students in "personal life ad!justment" as family members, potential consumers, and 
citizens. This program, at least at the secondary school level, stimulated consider­
able criticism for a time, and at least under that title, did not long survive the 
Russian launching of Sputnik. But opponents pointed out that progressive educa­
tion, which already had succeeded in coming, to dominate much of public elemen­
tary school education, had found a foothold in the high school programs of the 
nation, and they predicted there would be an eventual deterioration in the aca­
demic preparation of those high school students who chose to attend college. 
If the picture sketched above is not entirely inaccurate, the question arises 
as to how ideas coming from a first-rate mind such as Dewey's could. be so seriously 
misunderstood a; to produce what Dewey himself recognized to be an anti-intellect­
ual force affecting educational practices, a force he did his best to combat during 
the last days of his long and active life. One possible explanation, of course,· is that 
Dewey was not so much misunderstood as that he failed to win complete victory 
for his views, and that competing ideas achieved certain successes as well. I am sure 
that this matter is a complex one, but to the degree that one accepts the same view 
that Dewey did, namely, that many of his ideas were misinterpreted and many of 
his recommendations were misunderstood, I believe that much of the explanation 
may lie with two considerations, one related to the habits and practices of organ-
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ized professions and professional institutions, and the other related to the self-de­
fensive persistence of broad social doctrines and beliefs. The first explanatory 
consideration concerns (1) the tendency of professional organizations an.d institu­
tions to create and employ what I would call institutionalized action language, 
(2) the processes by which ideas and doctrines are translated into such language, and 
(3) the results of such translation. The second explanatory consideration concerns 
the tendency of the currently dominant ep\stemological assumptions of a society 
to absorb e�erging ideas and doctrines in a way which 
·
permits those emerging 
ideas and doctrines to be viewed as supporting the existing epistemological assump· 
tions, rather than bringing them into question. In saying something about both 
considerations, i shall suggest that the consequences of the former process in part 
may gain definition and dire.ction from the latter process. 
An emerging doctrine which advocates institutional chane:e. whether or not 
it is judged at first to be appealing either as to content or style, is likely to become 
a candidate for translation into institutionalized action language by those who 
consider themselves responsible for providing institutional leadership and diredioo, 
once the doctrine is judged to be sufficiently important. Judging the doctrine to be 
sufficiently important, of course, means more than that it has been accorded a 
certain respect; by "sufficiently important,, I mean that the doctrine is seen as 
promising either to serve or to defeat the interes� of those doing the judging to a 
s_ignificantly higher degree than any rival doctrine then emerging, or any other 
existing doctrine. It does not really matter whether those doing the judging identi­
fy - their own interests selfishly or altruistically -- thafis to say, whether they are 
concerned to promote their private gain on the one hand, or som ... � .selfless and 
worthy institutional purpose on the other -· so long as the potential threats or 
potential benefits of the doctrine ar;e taken seriously ; one may assume that motiva­
tion always is strongest in those instances when individuals discover that their pri­
vate gain and the serving of their altruistic principles appear to coincide. By "insti· 
tutionalized action language" I mean the kind of language considered to be most 
effective in communicating with institution members while at the same time en­
couraging positive reactions to proposed action. If institutionalized action language 
is to achieve these two purposes, it must be able to convey ideas in easily recog­
nizable and understandable forms, it must be sufficiently general as to promote 
wide applicability and appeal, and it must not appear to threaten seriously ei�her 
the popularly-accepted purposes of the institution or the long-term interests of 
institution members; in a word, it  must become the subject matter for appealing 
slogans, for the kind of short�hand communication which almost inevitably leads 
to over-simplification. 
I suggest that Dewey's educational proposals, in the main, were characterized 
by an abstract density of style which begged for exegesis, for conversion to a more 
easily understood popular idiom, and that these educational proposals were taken 
seriously by influential professors of Education in colleges and universities and by 
leaders of professiol}al teacher organizations and contributors to professional jour­
nals. It is not surprising that the ideas and proposals presented in his scholarly 
writings became prim(!' material for translation into institutionaliz.ed action language, 
or that many of them were sufficiently simplified and generalized as to become 
�own in slogan form. Examining an hypothetical instance of the translation of a 
complex idea into institutionalized action language is rather like watching a cliche 
struggling to be born, so perhaps a single example will suffice. The following ex: 
cerpt is from Dewey's How We Think: 
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Any teacher who is alive to the modes of thought operative In the 
natural experience of the normal child will have no difficulty in 
avoiding the identification of the logical with a ready-made organiza­
tion of subject matter, as well as the notion that the way to escape 
this error is to pay no attention to logical considerations. Such a 
teacher will have no diffictdty in seeing that the real 'problem of 
intellectual education is the transformation of natural powers into 
expert, tested powers: the transformation of more or less casual 
curiousity and sporadic suggestion into attitudes of alert, cautious, 
and thorough inquiry. He will see that the psychological and the 
logical, instead of being opposed to each other (or even independent 
of each other), are connected as the earlier and the terminal, or con­
cluding stages of the same process. He will recognize, moreover, that 
the kind of logical arrangement that marks subject matter at the 
stage of maturity is not the only kind possible; that the kind found 
in scientifically organized material is actually undesirable until the 
mind has reached a point of maturity where it is capable of un.der­
standing just why this form, rather than some other, is adopted.3 
Translated into institutionalized action langu�ge and reduced to slogan, this be­
comes'. "Teach children, not subject matter." 
When we consider carefully what Dewey's recommendations really were as 
to the place that subject matter should have in the educative process, the dangers 
of over-simplification inherent in the use of institutionalized action language be­
comes apparent. It is clear that his recommendations were neither unreasonable 
nor at all anti-intellectual in tone or intent. He began by suggesting that those who 
believe logical behavior to be foreign to the natural tendencies of children form 
two contrasting schools of thought. The first school would attempt to make chil­
dren logical by presenting them with a logical analysis of a subject in matured 
scientific detail, thus failing to take into consideration important elements of the 
psychology of learning and discovery appropriate to the child's age and level of 
intellectual development. The second school, which also believes logical thought to 
be foreign to children, thinks they become logical only thrQugh some natural proc­
ess of maturation and development, not through the study! of subject matter, and 
so encourages free self-expression, spontaneity, individualism, and the natural un­
folding of the child's interests. 
Both these schools of thought Dewey thought to be wrong, for what seem in 
part to be psychological reasons. He took children to be logical in spirit and 
inclination, if not in technique. He advocated the acquisition of habits of logical 
techniques of thinking through encouraging the process of reflection, through meetr 
ing and overcoming genuine intellectual obstacles, through experimenting with ideas 
and testing them in practice -- through the achievement of intellectual indepen­
dence at the child's level of development. Unfortunately, the first half of this 
message ·· that subject matter characterized by rigidly logical organization and 
matured development, to be "mastered" through memorization and drill, if necess­
ary, would not make students logical but might very well make. them bored -- was 
the message that got through. What often replaced the traditional approach to sub­
ject matter turned out to be what Dewey also had warned against: over-emphasis 
on the following expressed (or assumed) interests of the child (and so, a fortiori. 
on whatever proceeded from his freedom of expression), and so on a curriculum so 
Oexible it might be seen as "emerging" from day to day, and week to week. The 
86 
7
Kiefer: Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Education
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1980
Howard Kief er 
emerging curriculum generated a good deal of diversity, to put it mildly, and often 
placed final responsibility for program decision in the hands of the classroom teach­
er. At the beginning of the movement's popularity , I suspect that many, if not most, 
public school teachers probably did not deviate too radically from what they may 
haw been accustomed t.o dang earlier, rut som! were surely more imaginative. I remem­
b�r one sixth-grade teacher who believed that the "integration" of the child could 
only follow from the integration of the curriculum, and so used her new-found 
curricular freedom to plan the Fall semester around the topic of coal ·· the children 
studied the geological origins of coal, the mining of coal, the chemistry of coal, the 
geography of coal, the economics of c6al, the social implications of coal, and they 
wrote essay:; and poems about coal, and drew pictures of it. I have forgotten what 
was planned for the Spring semester. A junior-high school teacher I knew, who also 
was a Republican, when advised that he must not any longer follow textbooks in 
too rigid a fashion, discovered that he could best meet the needs of his pupils by 
preceding an investigation of the merits of Roosevelt's New Deal with a two-week 
survey of the decline and fall of the Roman empire. 
Other Deweyan insights, as they became increasingly available in the form of 
institutionalized action language, became the conventional wisdom, and were re­
peated in numerous ways in professional journals and at professional meetings,..and 
supported by colleges and schools of education in universities, professional organi· 
zations, state departments of education, and the U.S. Office of Education. Some 
of the slogans which became popular seemed to carry these insights to a level of 
logical abs.urdity which De�ey himself was unable to check. For example, his belief 
that practical experience provides an excellent way of learning for children as well 
as adults led. to the adoption of .teaching methodologies which glorified "doing" 
projects and demeaned "bookish" ones; his concern that the school should attempt 
to provide for the balanced development of the child, which became known as 
"meeting the needs of the whole child," led to the notion that the child's need for 
academic learning (a need which seldom seemed to place excessive strain on the 
child) was less important than any other need; that education was not just prepara­
tion for life, but was life itself for the child, was taken as justifying the rejection of 
educational procedures which failed to produce immediately obvious gratification 
for students; that education i5 growth and its purpose more growth became a reason 
for the teacher not to interfere too much in whatever natural processes might be 
going on; and so on. 4 
It is clear that whenever complex ideas are converted to institutionalized 
action language and then eventually to slogans, the potential for trouble is at least 
three-fold: first, such slogans too often are too general or too vague to provide any 
kind of consistent guide for intelligent behavior, even in ordinary circumstances, 
to say nothing of complicated ones; second, they are likely to become the war-cries 
of those who care more for winning whatever battle they believe themselves engaged 
in, than for knowing why they are fighting one; and third, their use can lead to the 
eventual emergence of an increasingly pervasive orthodoxy, the final enthusiastic 
refinement of which can be a kind of fanaticism. The self-image of fanaticism in· 
variably appears as an honorable and unswerving dedication to worthy principle, so 
that what may eventually tU1rn out to be the rankest nonsense can, for a time, wear 
the twin masks of reason and virtue. How long this state of affairs continues would 
seem to be directly related to the length of time in which the repetition of slogans 
is permitted to substitute for the critical analysis of prior assumptions. Unfortunate. 
ly, slogans more often seem to encourage action in preference to critical thinking 
("the unexamined life is not worth living" surely is a notable exception) and aim 
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more at generating attitudes of positive acceptance rather than attitudes of doubt 
and skepticism. Sincere slogan-making requires the holding of firm convictions as 
to the issues involved, and we need not be surprised to learn that those who are 
quite sure that they have the correct answers to all the important questions are not 
likely to consider wide diversity of opinion to be a social phenomenon requiring 
encouragement. 
I shall not argue the question of whether, on the whole, Dewey's educational 
ideas left American public education better off than not, but I would agree with 
Dewey himself that the outcome was mixed, and that both his influence and the 
influence of. those who misinterpreted him remain with us . .I now turn to the second 
explanatory consideration I suggested had contributed to this mixed influence: the 
ways in which emerging ideas and concepts tend to be accommodated by the dom­
inant epistemological assumptions of a society. 
Dewey's brilliant defense of pragmatism, and his bold and uncompromising 
rejection of theoretical absolutes in all aspects of his philosophy, had a certain se­
ductive appeal in that they seemed to be consistent with the beliefs about truth 
and knowledge held by the majority of Americans, who thought Qf themseJves as 
practical men rather than theoreticians, as men of action rather than scholars. After 
all, if what really matters in achieving knowledge is not the mastery of someone 
else's elaborate theories, but rather the investigation of what happens in practice, 
then those who actively try things out are superior to those who only sit and think. 
The restless spirit of the American frontier takes it as certain that those most 
likely to succeed are those who dare, who experiment, who find a way of coming 
to terms with what is, as yet, unknown, namely, the changing demands of the 
future ·· not those who only lay claim to have learned the lessons of the quite possi­
bly irrelevant past. Commenting on Dewey's epistemology, his philosophy of exper­
imentalism, and his denial of the possibility of absolute knowledge, F.S.C. North­
rup wrote in 194 7 :  
What Dewey's followers acquired was not his correct thesis that 
theory and its theoretical problems are as necessary a part of scienti­
fic inquiry as empirical evidence and experimental methods - the 
theory merely being indirectly rather than directly and absolutely 
confirmed by experiment -· but the erroneous assumption that ex­
perimentation and an appeal to what happens in practice, without 
guiding theoretical principles, are alone what matters, both in sci­
ence and in life. Thus the notion got abroad .... that people facing the 
basic theoretical problems of science, philosophy, and culture were 
either antiquated old mossbacks or speculative armchair thinkers 
dealing with irrelevant pseudo-problems. The people who found 
thinking difficult, or who lacked the logic.al or mathematical training 
necessuy to enable them to pursue it effectively, liked this sugges­
tion since it lulled them into the complacent fool's paradise in which 
they were the scientific and effective people, and the theoretically 
directed, logically disciplined minds were the evil spirits. 5 
Northrup goes on to say that some professors also liked this suggestion because it 
seemed to provide them with justificatiqn for an experimentally-sanctioned, univer­
sally-applicable methodology for teaching anything, even when their familiarity 
with the subject matter concerned might appear to be unduly limited. 
During the decades when Dewey's philosophical writings presented his ideas 
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as to the tentative nature of knowledge� the experimental method.of logical inquiry, 
and the practical necessities of reflective thinking, the popularly-accepted 'epistemol­
ogy in America seemed to be .that of the practical man, rather than the scholar, who 
saw truth as the end-product of common . sense in reaction with those practical 
problems produced by rapidly changing times -- rather than seeing truth as the end· 
product of formal schooling ·· and who thus.valued practice above theory. I believe 
Dewey's ideas were easily absorbed by the spirit of the age to the degree that they 
could be interpreted as championing common sense and practical action, and as 
seeming to challenge what was viewed as overly-technical or overly-philosophical 
traditions of the.oretical scholarship,. I am, therefore, in basic agreement with Noi;tti­
rup ·· in the main, what some of Dewey's supporters acquired was a theory of 
action which failed to incorporate a balanced Deweyan respect for the role of 
theory itself ..llld the disciplinary effects and benefits of traditional. scholarship. 
Unfortunately, the tendency to dismiss theory en bloc also is the tendency to 
dismiss theories of analysis on which searching criticism is based. The vacuum 
created by the rejection of theoretical views more typical of an earlier period, such 
as religious Puritanism, with its accompanying pessimism as to man's helplessness 
and his essential depravity, was gradually filled with an increasing optimism which 
brought with it no balanced theoretical mode of critical analysis 0th.er than the 
prized common sense of the practical man -- a method of reasoning thought of as 
applicable to down-to-earth problem solving rather than the critical analysis of the 
Zeitgeist. As applied to educational theory, this lack of balance made room for a 
romantic.ally optimistic view of the child as capable of a natural maturation toward 
the final achievement of human excellence, if given sufficient freedom from arti· 
ficial restraints ·· a view more reminiscent of Rosseau than Dewey, who continued 
to warn that there was nothing intellectually magical about reaching adolescence. 6 
Romantically. optimistic faith did npt center on human nature as its.only object, 
however, but sometimes was placed in the seemingly unlimited and almost magical 
promise of the developing s-ciences ·· such as the application . of techniques of app· 
lied psychology in the classroom. Articles appearing in .some teachei: journals ad­
monished teachers to give high priority to child adjustment problems and to the 
"redirection" of p,ersonality, rather than to merely cognitive matters or to the 
dev�lopment of purely inte11ectual skills. It seemed to be assumed that desirable 
personality changes would be forthcoming if only the teacher woul!i learn to limit 
his concern with the child's academic achievement and mastery of subject matter, 
so as t.o make room for the attempt to effect such personality changes -- changes 
which a trained psychiatrist might hesita� to expect �fter lengthy private analysis 
and treatment. Be that as it may, I shall say no more on this subject, turning instead 
to comment on the matter of the apparent c9nflict between the practical and the 
theoretical, as it sometimes seems to be popularly conceived. . 
Whatever unfriendly feelings some practitioners and theoreticians may have 
for each other, direct conflict between theory and practice is a myth. Nothing is 
"true" in theory and "false" in practice, or vice versa: however coherent and free 
from self -contradic;tion, no theory· is adequate which fails to account for what 
happens in. practice; and what happens in practice,  .unless it somehow is theoretic­
ally explained, understood, or fitted into a larger context, remains a factual mystery. 
Dewey is right in insisting that the.final test of any theory is whether it "works" in 
the sense that its implications and predictions are consistent with events .. But com· 
pletely unexplained events, completely unaccounted�for facts, or what might be 
called completely raw data must be as meaningless to a man as to a rabbit .. witho\lt 
the context of theory, they are at ,best things processed by the senses1 not grasped 
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by the mind. This means that theory is the intellectual twin of practice, not its 
opponent; its verbal description and explanation, not something separate or wholly 
other. 1he prized "common sense" of the anti-theoretical man is nothing but theory 
-- perhaps informal theory, unsophisticated theory, imprecisely stated theory, or 
even untested theory, but theory none the less. Its validity, as with all theory, de­
pends upon what practical events may determine; to accept common sense and to 
deny theory in this way of looking at it is to contradict itself. 
Anyone familiar with Dewey, or perhaps even with William James, will find 
nothing very new in this account of the relationship between the<;>ry and practice. 
But having affirmed my agreement with the analysis, I would add one final word of 
caution. If the so-called practical man is wrong in being unduly suspicious of theory, 
the consequence of which may lead him to an uncritical acceptance of ideas whose 
rational credentials may be lacking, I think he may not be entirely wrong if he 
entertains som� practical doubts as to the universal application of reason itself -- at 
ll?a�t in the sense that there are limits to the uses of iogical, scientific, or philosophi­
cal analysis. Logicians and philosophers may sigh that the world is not more ra­
tional , and we may well sigh with them, but it is not at all clear that we have a right 
to expect reason to be equally apt and equally indispensable in our dealings with 
all the matters which claim our attention. For example, in a certain crucial sense, 
reason has very little to do directly with two of man's chief preoccupations, fove 
and arts, oo I believe anyone would attest who ever. has been seriously involved in the 
making of either. No doubt · Plato enjoyed analyzing love as a Form and writing 
about it in the Symposium, and those of us who are membe� of the American 
Society for Aesthetics I am sure enjoy doing the philosophy of art and benefit both 
i.ntellectually and aesthetically -- but no one should think that analyzing an emotion 
really is exactly the same as having it, or that understanding or even appreciating a 
work of art really is exactly the same as creating or making one. Man possesses 
many capacities in addition to his capacity to reason; he makes his world in addi­
tion to discovering it; in a word, man is a complex being whose nature does not 
yield too readily to scientific or philosophical analysis, and it surely is unwise to 
prete�d to know ·everything about him . . One is safe from error, of course, in gener­
alizing at a certain remote level of abstraction. Aristotle thought man a political 
animal; Chomsky thinks him a linguistic one; both of course are right: men prove 
it when they are cheaters and liars and heroes and poets. However sympathetic to 
reason and however intellectualized we become; we cannot escape from the possi­
bility that reason may not be everything, and that sometimes, if only rarely, a man 
even may think too much before he acts. If it is true that on occassion we behave 
like fools, it also is true that on occassion we become aware of it; whenever we do, 
the important thing first is to stop, and only then to take the time to work out the 
reasons why. 
* "* * * * * * * * * * * 
Some of the problems plaguing higher education in the United States are 
largely material in nature, while others seem more philosophical, although it is clear 
that they often are related to each other. The former include some of the most 
serious, such as the problem of gaining adequate financial support for educational 
institutions, the problem of generating sufficient enrollment of the sort most.likely 
to profit from the experience, the problem of providing adequate research facilities 
and research opportunities for faculty and graduate students so 'that reasonable 
progress in the disciplines may be furthered, and so on. Of these I shall say-little, 
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except as they may relate directly to those issues of institutional direction and pur­
pose which are associated with certain more philosophical problems. 
There are two problems of philoso.phical interest, often mentioned separa�y. 
which I believe to be connected: (1) the apparent trend toward specialization in 
higher education at the undergraduate level, sometimes referred to as vocationalism 
or the job-oriented professionalization of the curriculum, and the conflict of this 
trend with m>m traditional concepts of the importance of undergraduate liberal arts 
curricula; and (2) the trend toward egalitarianism and away from exclusivity, both 
in the make-up of the student body, and in the nature of the curriculum at the 
undergraduate level. 
With regard to the first issue, it is regretted by some that what they take to be 
the �riginal purpose of undergraduate education, i.e., the providing of an education 
in the liberal arts, is being crowded out by a new and increasingly _pervasive student 
tendency to judge the relevance of all unde.rgraduate study in terms of job prepara­
tion. As one who shares the belief that the liberal arts are of major value to the pur­
poses of higher education, I think a number of comments may be made. First, it 
cannot be doubted that many if not most students are deeply concerned with 
future employment, and such concern indeed may be on the rise, but it is historic­
-ally incorrect to assume that higher education in the United States, in the main, 
ever was indifferent to career preparation, both as one of its major functions and as 
one of its chief justifications for existence. AF, we a�l know, it was the sober recogni­
tion of the need to produce Puritan ministers that moved the General Court of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colcny in 1636 to provide a grant establishing the first endur­
ing institution of higher education in the British colonies in America. During the 
eighteenth century, as its religious attachment to Congregationalism declined, Har­
vard grew to be a first-rate institution of general studies at the UJndergraduate level, 
but by then it had established graduate' schools of divinity, law, and medicine. The 
general undergraduate liberal arts college long has served as a kind of prep-school 
for the professional school or college, whose programs at the graduate level have 
tended to influence if not dominate undergraduate curricula. No doubt there has 
always been some resentment of this influence by those undergraduate professors 
who think their work to be essential in preparing for 'any profession, or think of it 
as producing the cultural awareness and intellectual development of the student 
which has an importance equal to or greater than that of career preparation. This is 
not to say that the sciences, arts, and humanities, even as taught at the undergrad­
uate level, cannot also be thought of as professional studies. There are careers to 
be had in the performing arts, and there are the honored professions of journalist, 
writer, historian; artist, and practicing scientist, all of which normally require a 
liberal arts undergraduate education of a -sort, however specialized or segregated 
portions of that education may become under the influence of the organized pro­
fessions and the graduate schools which increasingly have provided entrance to 
them; In addition, there always is the need to prepare a new generation of college 
teachers, which would seem to provide vocational justification for undergraduate 
instruction in every existing liberal arts area, including even philosophy, a discipline 
which provides its practitioners no other obvious way to be included among the 
ranks of the gainfully employed. Perhaps those of us who serve or have served in 
philosophy departments have been made particularly sensitive to the apparen t  in­
crease in vocationalism: it is a commonplace to note that many questions ooce 
called philosophical have coalesced to become the separate sciences, leaving philo­
sophy in possession of what long has been a steadily shrinking field of.inquiry. AF, 
university budgets and student enrollments decline, some of us are beginning to 
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fear that philosophy departments still are considered to be de rigueur in colleges of 
arts and sciences only in the sense that crossed swords are accepted as appropriately 
placed over the mantlepiece; their continuing presence is sanctioned as a sort of 
decorative reminder of our colorful past, but no one wishes to think of circum­
stances which might restore them to their original importance. 
· · As demands for vocationalized curricula increase, other academic departments 
have begun to be concerned -- not only as to their potential existence, but as to the 
effect of such changes on the quality of higher education in the long term. That 
faculty members are concerned with their professional welfare certainly is: hardly 
surprising; that they have been unwilling or unable to unite· effectiv�ly in support 
of a broad liberal arts ·education as the kind of education required (and perhaps 
even deserved) by every intelligent student is less easy to understand. If too many 
students have come to think of higher education only as a way to further their own 
private vocational prospects, it may be in part because too many professors think of 
.. higher education in exactly the same way. The defense of the liberal arts curricul� 
seems to have been left to professors who have become so narrowly ·specialized -­
perhaps in response to academic and professional competition -- that they have 
come to consider the study of their own discipline to be obviously essential, and the 
study of everyone else's discipline to be obviously optional. To the extent.that this 
attitude of curricular narcissism cannot be overcome, the preservation of the values 
of the liberal arts remains in doubt. 
It is, of course, ·somewhat understandable that a professor may mistake his 
enthusiasm for his own discipline as evidence for the universality of its importance, 
but students sure;ly should know better. In making his judgments about what is·im­
portant in his program, any student who becomes routinely impatient with any 
part of his course of study which fails to meet his private tests of vocational rele­
vance is in danger of mistaking what may be to his ultimate advantage. To stop too 
often to ask . "Is this likely to be of any practical use?" or "Am I really enjoying 
this?" is to make the likeliest answer to both questions "No.,, To be solely con­
cerned with advancing one's perceived interests is to make such advancement un­
certain, not· because Providence punishes the self-concerned, but because none of 
us ··not even the young --can ever be completely and absolutely certain as to where 
our best interests lie, or that our judgments. are ·unfailingly sound. If we refuse to 
recognize this, we refuse to recognize that there may be .something important y.et 
to be learned, and we abandon the role of scholar for that of swami. In a student 
such an .attitude, though certainly intellectually unhealthy, may. not be incurable 
if there still is time to expose him to· some excellent te.aching, and if he still is able 
to profit from it; in a professor on the other hand, it sometimes turns out,to be 
intellectually fatal. 
I. do not mean to imply that students should accept. the opinions of others as 
to what is good for them without submitting such opinions to rigorous examina­
tion and review, nor that t!hey should in any way quit the responsibility of think­
ing things through for themselves. I mean only that all of us must be willi.ng to 
submit our own ideas to the-same critical analysis to which we subject the ideas of 
others -- and then do our best to retain a degree of reasonable doubt as to the valid­
ity of our conclusions. For most of. us, this virtue is easier to acknowledge than it 
is to practice, as Socrates so often is allowed to show us in Plato's dialogues, but it 
remains sine qua non of achieving a point of view worth having. · 
. 
· What· bothers some observors of the trend toward vocationalism in higher 
education is not so much the vocational attitudes of undergraduates,. nor even the 
historic, if increasing, infiuence that graduate schools and professional organiza-
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tions bring to bear on undergraduate liberal arts programs, but rat�er the introdue­
t.ion of new curricul� designed to prepare studentS for entrance into vocations- not 
usually thought of as requiring a college education "at all -- especially, perhaps, · a 
college education in which the study of the liberal arts is thought to be of central 
importance. In their drive for students, some colleges have broadened their offer­
ings to include so-called academic majors of a new and surprising character, pre­
sumably on grounds that the liberal arts may h�ve a contribution to make, both to 
the student and to the field or vocation. It sometimes. is argued that for anyone to 
insist otherwise is to reveal himself to be an academic snob or a narrow-minded 
traditionalist of the most inflexible kind. On this issue I believe it to be important 
for those who value the study of the liberal arts to take a firm stand. It is essential 
that higher education survive its current difficulties, but it also is essential not to 
destroy the ultimate justification of its survival by the very methods we employ to 
achieve it. The problem, of course, is really not one of snobbery nor of d�fending 
an out.!tnoded tradition: it is one of preserving whatever may be left of the integrity 
of the educational experience. Some colleges have announced vocational programs 
in fish-and-game management and automobile repair and maintenance, which would 
seem to have a less-than-obvious symbiotic relationship with the liberal arts. Perhaps 
the crucial test of whether a particular vocational program should be included with­
in the offerings of a college of arts and sciences, is the degree to which intellectual 
benefits in particular, or other benefits not of a purely vocational nature, might 
accrue to students who elect to study aspects of the program, but who have no in­
tention of choosing the vocation as a career. There would always be serious differ­
ences of opinion on such matters, of course, but at least the resulting quarrels 
wocld raflect attempts to preserve some reasohable standard of intellectual quality 
in programs of higher education,. and they surely are preferable to the tacit agree­
ment that there are no standards to preserve, or th.at literally anything should count 
as higher· education so long as some students are willing to pay to study it. In deal­
ing with issues of this kind, it is, I believe, equally as wrong to equate intellectttal· 
ism with being broadminded; our concerns should focus, not on labels, but on 
issues and their consequences. 
The consequences for the integrity of higher education, when financial pres-­
sures become great, perhaps may be illustrated by what has happened at some 
colleges and ·universities to what used to be thought of as the amateur athletic 
program. It obviously has become extremely profitable for universities to maintain 
successful athletic teams, so that television coverage and gate receipts may support 
other university programs, and so that the favorable publicity gained may encour­
age favorable consideration by potential students and potential donors. Preserv­
ing the public's faith in the amateur nature of the proceedings has been something 
of a probl�m from time to time, and many institutions have shown considerable 
creativity in dealing with it. At some universities, co"urses such as ''The Philosophy 
of Basketball" now must be attempted by students seeking to meet the academic 
requirements of a major in Sports Science. Unfortunately, not all institutions seem 
to hold unfailingly to high standards of academic achievement: on occassion, stu­
dent-athletes have been credited on the record with courses not taken, and off the 
record with illegal payments which were, while busy establishing a record for athlet­
ic prowess impressive enough to ensure eventual employment as professional foot­
ball players· or basketball players, against the day when their current desire for 
scholarly attainment may have begun to lose some of its urgency. This thirst for 
knowledge of the potential professional. athlete has been duly acknowledged by 
the vast majority of American universities, who have found it appropriate to rein· 
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vest 1n their ath�tic programs by. providing a remarkable number of" athl�tic schol­
arships," thus ensuring a continuing reputation for successful athletic performance. 
So general has this acknowledgement become that it has l)een found necessary to 
regulate it by establishing limits, so that no single institution may seem to enj.oy a 
special advantage. As a result, the maximum number of such grants permitted h·as 
become the number made available, thus leading to occassional abuses," so that even 
at an institution with the standards of morality and traditions of scholarship of 
Notre .Dame Univ�rsity, the likelihood in a giyen year that the memb.ers of the foot­
ball squad will turn out t() be ge11.uine scholar-athletes may not be substantially great­
e.r than the likelihood that they will tum out to be Irish. 
'I'.he proliferati9n of vocationa� programs may be considered as connected 
with, and in certain ways as reflecting, the trend toward .egalitarianism, both as to 
the nature of the curriculum and the nature of the student. body. With regard to 
the latter, the�e n�w is a/major difference of opinion as to whether almost anyone 
ought to be permitted to try higher education, or whether ce.rtain minimum stan­
dards for admission and contfnuing participation should be enfo�ced. Even those 
who agree on the traditional principle of exclusivity seldom seem to agree on what 
minimum qualifications for admission should be established, or how they should be 
measured. 
One such qualification ·· perhaps the one most frequently mentioned .. is 
appropriate student command of language and facility with or�l and 'Yritten expres­
sion. This qualification often is used to illustrate what may be the most common 
�!gt:�cilt for the principle of exclusivity: the claim that bad scholarship drives out 
good. It is argued that too many would-be college freshman arrive on campus as 
functional illiterates lnsofar as the demands of higher education are concerned .. un­
able .to command language with sufficient expertise to deal successfully with the 
comple� ideas and concepts which are an essential part of higher education, and 
with which Gtudents must deal if the experience is not to become a sh,am. It some­
times is further argued that if considerable numbers of such students are allowed to 
remain, in the hope that the experience somehow may tum out to be of value for 
them, the classes they attend inevitably will be adversely ·affected. Teachers may 
attempt to explain complex ideas by over-simplifying them or by otherwise mis­
representing them, or, in desperation, may just deci�e to leave many of them out. 
This denies normal access to the important concep·ts by the more qualified students 
in attendance, and has the even more serious consequence �I lowering tl1e levels of 
expectation of both faculty and student, so that the ultimate character of the insti­
tution ,is shaped, not by the excellence of its faculty and stude�t scholars, but by 
the lowest intellectual common denominator of scholarly ability present in the 
student body. · 
· 
In reply to these serious charges, the suggestion someti�es .is made that the 
institutiqn of higher education has the obligation to deal wit.h students a� whateyer 
lev�l of compe�ency it finds them, and to learn :to do it efficiently. There is an argu­
ment to· the effect that, if. a lack of a precis� command of language inhibits logical 
thought, gaining .a precise command o.f language should enable one to t�ink logic­
ally. Unfortunately, thi� turns out to, be too optimistic if the command of language 
represents only a necessary �ut not a sufficien� condition for logical thought. What­
ever remedies. may be attempted at parti�ular institutions, it see·ms too unrealistic 
.to expect that long-es�b.lis.he.d habits of verbal incompetency and imprecision of 
tl)ought and expression can easily be erased by providing the student .with a semes­
ter or two of remedial English •· a hoped-for miracJe which generate� considerable 
skepticism ewn among ··or perhaps especially among .. professors of English. Giving 
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saneone a giammatiral command of his language surely is no guarantee that he ever w.ill 
write or say anything ·worth reading or hearing, but if someone ever is capable of 
making essential distinctions or of doing reasonably precise thinking, he and we 
shall discover it only if he can express it to himself and to us in something other 
than the winks, twitches, and groans of the truly illiterate, or the uncritically-adopt­
ed generalities, slang-cliches, and grammatical · contradictions of the semiliterate. 
Society has the right to defend itself from the tyranny of the ignorant, and in high­
er education, at least, I .believe it is time we stopped accepting this form of intellect­
ual incompetency as a legitimate variation on the theme of freedom of speech. 
Locke's warning �hat much of what purports to be education fits us rather 
for the university than the world, today might be rephrased to say that' much of 
what purports �o be education fits us for neither. In higher education there is a crisis 
of confidence as to what is important and what is not, and many of the important 
decisions which will be made seem beyond our influence and control. In producing 
the professional, we may have begun to lose sight of the importance of producing 
the amateur, and those values most often associated with educational purposes that 
are essentially non-vocational. To fit someone for a successful career and a useful 
life certainly is ·important, but it is not everything, and I believe the ultimate worth 
of a culture and the transcendent merits of a society eventually must be judged by 
what else is taken to be important. The study of the liberal arts should need no 
further justification than that" it truly represents the study of the best creative 
achievements of mankind. 
The study of philosophy, when most effedive, creates in the student three 
habits of mind: the habit of being clear as to what he believes, the habit of asking 
himself why he believes it, and the habit of being suspicious of answers too easy, 
comfortable, or vague. The study of.. the sciences brings the student to confront the 
reality of evidenc·e, and makes him familiar with the values to be gained in match­
ing theories of description and explanation with their proper tests. Students discover 
that history, literature, and the arts have their own intrinsic delights, and they come 
to realize that these creative acts are more than the decorations of the cultural rec­
ord or the valued possessions of the educated mind, whenever they light a candle 
to our imperfections or let us glimpse the possibilities of human excellence. 
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